THE New Republic

What Khrushchev Wants at the Summit

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MARCH 30, 1959

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Washington Wire

On Toward the Summit

WE now seem headed toward the Summit. The conference may, of course, make matters worse. But on the whole, we suspect, it is a good thing. In any case it is inevitable. The impasse heretofore has been that a foreign ministers' meeting was meaningless because it omitted Head of State Khrushchev, and a heads of state meeting was meaningless because it omitted Foreign Minister Dulles. Now a formula has apparently been found to hold a foreign ministers' conference first, and to follow this with a semi-automatic Summit meeting. Four years after Geneva the reluctant Eisenhower and the irrepressible Khrushchev are to be brought together.

One can sympathize with Eisenhower. He has a real gift for conciliating men. His approach is frank and he looks for the highest motives. But once he loses faith he tends to become sourly unforgiving. He is not a facile politician or a resilient diplomat to deal suavely with somebody he detests. Men are black or white for him. He wrote off Harry Truman and his attitude toward him since has been gloomily priggish. Now he must go back and try to deal with Khrushchev who, he believes, did him dirt at Geneva.

We don't know whom Eisenhower will lean on. Lacking Dulles, it may be Macmillan who has the kind of high-toned approach Eisenhower respects.

Silly Old Public

AFTER sitting on the news for six months *The New York Times* finally broke the story of Project Argus—that last fall we set off three small atomic blasts, 300 miles out in space. The revelation made Deputy Defense Secretary Quarles unhappy: the *Times,* he said, "was not playing the game with the Department the way I would like it to be played." The *Times* indicated that it hadn't disclosed the secret till scientists urged it and the Soviet suspected it. Unknown to the rest of the world and to all but a handful of Americans we were monkeying with the universe. What we can do any atomic power can do; since we asked nobody's permission, nobody need ask our permission either. Meanwhile Senator Anderson (D, N.M.), chairman of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, reveals that radioactive fall-out is higher than expected: "In layman's language," he said, "it looks like strontium 90 isn't staying up there as long as the AEC told us it would, and the fall-out is greatest on the US."

How can a democracy function if the people don't know the facts? At the present time a handful of generals have the authority to poison us all. Even the sheep-dog Anderson committee wasn't told of the experiment till four months after it occurred, and then they were put on their honor not to divulge it. Strangest attitude of all is that of the Pentagon which doesn't feel that the silly old public should bother its head about such matters.

The GOP Could Win

THE POLITICAL FRONT hasn't changed much but requires a report from time to time. On the Republican side Rockefeller has gained strength by boldly asking for higher taxes in New York; he hasn't got all he asked but the spectacle of a politician daring such a move helps build up the image of courage which Rockefeller supporters are trying to create. Meanwhile Nixon has been frozen out of the pre-Summit conferences with Macmillan, and wasn't asked to Camp David. It's our guess that Republicans have a much better chance of winning the Presidential race in 1960 than most believe. A lot will depend on whether business next year is good or bad; by holding back full recovery now the Administration may well be creating a period of peak prosperity just about summer and fall of next year. Certainly that would be the most advantageous time politically. If the GOP nominates Rockefeller, as we rather expect, the Democrats have no glamor candidate of the same stamp and the 1956 situation might well be repeated—"a" Republican winning (the White House), "the" Republicans losing (Congress.)

Obviously the alternative to a glamor candidate is a strong platform. That is why it is so important for the Democrats to establish the image of liberalism.

If the Democrats Trim

SPLIT CONTROL in Washington is just about ideal for conservative Southerners. They get a conservative in the White House (albeit of the opposition party) and they control the Congressional committee chairmanships. They are in that happy position now. Why should they want a strong figure like Hubert Humphrey as President, say, instead of Eisenhower? In fact, the beginning of another Dixiecrat bolt is already visible in some Southern states. Meanwhile, the Republicans are paying Paul Butler's National Democratic Advisory Council the highest compliment: they are instituting something like it.

Summing it up, we would guess the Democrats would win Congress next year but such a victory won't mean much unless a Democratic President goes with it. The chance of a Democratic President, we believe, depends on a positive, liberal candidate and platform, particularly if the Republicans have the benefit of prosperity (which now seems likely). The South may bolt as it has before but this should not mean Democratic defeat any more than it did in 1948. The thing that *would* defeat almost any Democratic Presidential candidate next year, we think, would be to try to trim on big issues, particularly civil rights.

Notes

EISENHOWER'S more active participation in affairs has raised quiet questions whether his health can stand it. . . . Canada is reacting angrily to the new US quotas on oil imports. . . . The Court of Appeals here is now determining the State Department's right to ban reporters' travel in Red China, a crucial case brought by Negro correspondent William Worthy.

T.R.B.

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The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

VOL. 140, NO. 13, ISSUE 2315
MARCH 30, 1959

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Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, 1244 - 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy, 25¢. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new addresses. Copyright 1959, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.

Correspondence

► *Senator Kennedy Replies*

SIRS:

IN YOUR ISSUE of March 2 you commented upon certain proposals I announced for revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act. I assume that you were referring to statements I made at a press conference called by the

(Continued on page 24)

Khrushchev's Agenda

AFTER THE President's television address, Mr. Khrushchev's press conference and Prime Minister Macmillan's visit to Washington, the stage seems set for a negotiated solution of the "Berlin crisis." Mr. Eisenhower has made it clear that we are not going to be pushed out of Berlin by threats; Mr. Khrushchev has responded by denying that he ever issued an ultimatum and by seeming to recognize our present occupation rights, for the time being. The Soviet leader has explained that what he really wants is a peace treaty with the two German states, including a new statute for West Berlin; and we have responded by indicating that we are willing to meet him for negotiation, even at the highest level, and by starting work on our own proposals for the reduction of military tension in Central Europe and the rapprochement of the two Germanies by stages. The prevailing impression at the moment is that the Berlin time bomb is ticking less loudly and may shortly become a spent force. Attention is now focused on the problems of a German and European settlement which sooner or later had to be negotiated anyhow.

So far, the picture looks brighter than it did a month ago; yet it would be blindness not to see the darker side. We ought, first of all, to be thinking not just of the Berlin crisis but of a probable succession of crises, and how, by a combination of diplomatic and military means, the West is going to meet and survive them. We are in a surf in which one wave will come after another, and the need is to develop better techniques of riding the waves. On the immediate problem of Berlin's future, there is no reason to believe that Mr. Macmillan "persuaded" Mr. Khrushchev of the advantages of negotiation over unilateral action. As was pointed out at the very beginning of the crisis (*NR*, Nov. 24), it was to be assumed all along that Mr. Khrushchev's real purpose in creating the Berlin scare was to make the West negotiate under pressure, and in particular to use the threat to our position in Berlin in order to force recognition of the East German Communist regime as permanent and legitimate. The threat is still there, in case the negotiations fail to produce the result desired by the Kremlin; for in that case, Mr. Khrushchev has told us, he will consider himself entitled to conclude a separate peace with the East German Government and will treat our occupation rights as null and void thereafter. Of course that is not the outcome he prefers: he wants us to cooperate in stabilizing Ulbricht, rather than to have to do it against us. To get our cooperation, he has to negotiate—and that he knew all along.

The kind of cooperation which Mr. Khrushchev expects from us as his price for being "accommodating" over Berlin has become much clearer in recent weeks, as a result of his speeches in Eastern Germany and of his talks with the emissaries of the German Social Democratic Party. His central demand is that we should sign a peace treaty with the two existing German states, and that nothing should be done to change or dissolve the East German Communist regime without its consent. He has *not* treated

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the problem primarily as one of Russian military security; he actually told the German Socialists that he does not care whether West Germany remains in NATO or not. He has shown a mild interest in proposals for a withdrawal of Western and Russian troops from Germany, but has claimed the right to return at any time to protect the East German Communist regime against internal changes "if these were due to interference from the Federal Republic." As in the Russian view the Hungarian revolution was due to interference by "Western imperialist agents," it is clear what that means: Mr. Khrushchev wants a treaty which will, even after the ultimate withdrawal of Soviet troops, contain no guarantees against their return. And he wants *us* to sign a treaty with the East German regime—not just to recognize it "de facto"—and thus to sanction Russia's permanent right to maintain the Communist regime there—and *a fortiori,* elsewhere in satellite Europe.

If that analysis is right, the negotiations are going to be far tougher than most of us have hitherto imagined; and the toughest issue is not going to be the future status of Berlin as such, but whether, in the President's words, we agree to the "permanent and compulsory division of the German nation." If we do that, the forcible Sovietization of Eastern Europe, which came about as a result of the division of military spheres of occupation agreed at Yalta, will be sanctioned as permanent; and the long-term prospects for a free Berlin will be dim. But if we refuse such a super-Yalta, the immediate threat to Berlin may still materialize.

It is vital to understand that the Western powers must be ready for the choice; for unless Mr. Khrushchev modifies his position *essentially*—which, despite his deliberately confusing tactics, he has not done so far—the West will be unable to evade that choice. In particular, neither the proposals for military disengagement with guarantees against a return of Soviet troops (which we have advocated), nor the more modest idea of a zone of controlled arms limitation sponsored by Mr. Macmillan offers a way out. The first has been turned down by Mr. Khrushchev in advance (which does not make it any less worth pursuing as a goal, but excludes it as an immediate solution of the present crisis). The second is simply irrelevant to the alternatives posed by Mr. Khrushchev: he may or may not like a "thinning out" of troops as a separate item on the conference agenda, but he will not abandon his major political objective, and the threat used to gain it, for the sake of what is essentially a minor gesture of good will.

Unless Mr. Khrushchev can be brought to change his position, the prospects for successful negotiation are therefore poor—and no longer because of a lack of flexibility on the side of the West. The only way to make him change his position is to show that, while we are preparing seriously for negotiation, we are also politically and militarily preparing for the possibility of failure. In particular, the Western powers should make it clear during the present preparatory phase, unitedly and publicly, that a peace treaty which recognizes the permanence of the imposed Communist regime in East Germany and the Russian right to protect it against its own subjects, whether explicitly or by implication, is not acceptable in any circumstances. The real threat to peace is not the Western position in Berlin, but the existence of an East German regime whose survival depends on its protection by Soviet troops; hence there can be no peace treaty signed by the West that does not guarantee the end of that protection.

But to make that point now means to change the entire emphasis of the public preparation for the Summit conference. Instead of stressing their willingness to make some transitional arrangements even with the present East German regime, the Western powers must stress their absolute insistence on the eventual disappearance of that Russian-imposed regime, and the reasons for it. Just as Khrushchev is preparing for negotiations by threatening the West at its strategically exposed spot, so our governments must prepare by attacking his political Achilles heel. That is the one means of convincing him that if the "Berlin crisis" gets out of hand, it may prove more dangerous for the regime he is so anxious to stabilize than for the West. It is the only way of giving our own proposals for a negotiated solution—including even transitional arrangements with the East German Communist regime—a fair chance of success.

Civil Rights Legislation

Of the proposals now before Congress for civil rights legislation, there are those that peck and sniff at the school segregation problem. And then there is the bill introduced by Sen. Paul Douglas of Illinois for himself and 16 other Senators—the large majority of them Democrats—and Rep. Celler, which proposes an imaginative new administrative attack on the segregation problem. Though the bill—now before the Judiciary Committees—has little chance of passage at this session, it is the necessary way of the future. At present and for the foreseeable future everything is peripheral to school segregation, for that issue has put into question in the South the very principle of government under law. Conventional measures in aid of the courts—even the best of them—miss the point, because the judicial process has now reached the limit of its capacity to effect compliance.

Among worthy legislative proposals which belong in the peripheral category are a number put forward by the Administration. These would: complement the contempt power of the federal courts by explicitly making it a federal crime (as possibly it already is under existing

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law, but possibly not) to use force or the threat of force to obstruct enforcement of court orders in school segregation cases; make it a federal offense to flee across state lines in order to avoid prosecution for damaging church or school buildings; require state election officials to retain and make available for inspection (rather than destroying and thus frustrating exercise of the authority granted the Attorney General in the Civil Rights Act of 1957) registration and other voting records for at least three years following general elections; extend the life of the Civil Rights Commission (created by the 1957 Act and endowed solely with investigating powers) for another two years; authorize very limited grants-in-aid on a matching basis chiefly to pay for non-teaching professional services should such grants be requested by states or school districts engaged in putting into effect existing desegregation programs, and make available, also upon request, information and technical assistance as well.

To say such measures are minor, as we do, is not to deprecate them. But they have limited value, and some similar bills that have been introduced have even less value. The proposal, for example, to punish as a criminal offense the dissemination of so-called hate literature, should be abandoned in deference to the superior idea that we practice freedom even for the thought that we hate. Likewise, Senator Johnson's notion of a federal Community Relations Service "to provide conciliation assistance in communities where [peaceful relations are threatened] by disagreements or difficulties regarding the laws or Constitution of the United States" is objectionable because of its implication of neutrality: that whether or not to obey a court decree is a matter on which different elements in the community—all equally devoted to the public good and seeking in equally lawful manner to advance their own interest—may reasonably differ, as they might about the merits of a labor dispute. Another questionable proposal is an old one, favored by much liberal opinion and included as a subsidiary part of the Douglas-Celler bill, to authorize the Attorney General to bring suits in the name of the government to restrain denials of equal protection of the laws, including segregation.

Such legal actions have in our system customarily been initiated by private parties and by institutions such as the NAACP. The trouble here is that the task of deciding when to sue and when not is almost an impossible one for an Attorney General, unaided by elaborate administrative machinery, to carry out wisely and fairly. Moreover, it may well be that the existence of such authority would inhibit the initiation of private litigation, since it will subject private litigants to the unfair but potent argument that they are trouble-makers and extremists since they are suing in a situation which the Attorney General, on the basis of his own inaction, may be presumed to think does not justify suit.

The totally different approach of the Douglas-Celler bill takes us to the heart rather than the periphery of the civil rights problem. It starts with a firm legislative declaration that the Supreme Court's construction of the Constitution in respect of racial segregation was right and necessary and expressed "the moral ideals of the nation." Such a declaration, which is to be distinguished from the Administration bill's pallid avowal that the Constitution as construed is after all the supreme law of the land, does not to be sure make law. But it is a declaration of the utmost importance, for it will undercut, as the President himself never has, the appeal to lawlessness that is constantly made in the South on the ground that the command to integrate the schools represents the will only of nine irresponsible, overbearing men. The Douglas bill then provides not only for technical assistance on a much greater scale than the Administration has proposed, but also for very substantial grants that need not be matched for school construction, employing teachers and specialists and for training them—all where needed for integration. And, what is perhaps most important, there would be grants to replace state payments that might have been withdrawn from a school district because it chose to integrate contrary to state segregation policy. Finally, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare is given self-starting power without waiting for formal requests to consult with local authorities and prepare school integration plans. Should these plans prove unacceptable to the local authorities, public hearings are provided for. Final plans which the Department may then issue may be enforced by suit brought by the Attorney General—who in this situation is, of course, in an entirely different position than if he were required, without administrative help and in the absence of a developed, concrete plan, to bring suit whenever he saw fit.

Thus the Douglas program—no doubt subject to refinement and improvement—would make intelligent, full use of the resources of government toward eventual solution of our gravest domestic problem. It is the only existing proposal that comes to grips with reality.

The Radiation Ring

In less than one hour last September the United States enveloped the earth with a ring of radiation which disrupted radio, radar and other communications for a short time everywhere. The news that this world-wide effect had been produced was kept secret from other nations affected for six months, although the experiment was a part of the International Geophysical Year and our nation, as a participant, was obliged eventually to reveal its findings. We trust that the strategic gain was great

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enough to outweigh the opprobrium that attaches to our having concealed the tests from the rest of the world. Senators who months ago listened to the Pentagon arguments for secrecy say that the conditions cited then had not changed when Project Argus (so suitably named—a monster with a hundred eyes) was finally unveiled last week. And there is reason, it appears, to believe that the Russians were not in the dark after all; two Soviet scientists reported their suspicions in some accurate detail 12 days before Project Argus made the headlines.

DATA collected by our Explorer IV satellite and by rockets sent up to monitor the effect of Argus atomic explosions in space indicate that production of an effective anti-missile missile may be even more remote than the armed services had thought. Such explosions, these first results seem to show, are in effect artificially induced magnetic storms which can be used to upset the long-range radars on which the Nike-Zeus anti-missile-missile system will depend. Although Deputy Secretary of Defense Donald Quarles says that nothing learned from the experiment has altered the basic concept of Nike-Zeus, experts in the Pentagon admit that present radar networks and anti-missile missiles now under development are not "sophisticated" enough for the future. Work on a top-secret "missile defense alarm satellite," called Project Midas, is being stepped up, according to Defense Research Director Herbert York. Spending for satellites to detect explosions in space will double next year. And those in the Pentagon who are more far-sighted are already concentrating on such future deterrent systems as:

> warning satellites that could spot a missile on its launching pad deep inside Russia; cloudbursts of special sand that could destroy an enemy warhead in flight; gravity-defying devices that might keep a missile from completing its fall to earth; and radiation that might destroy a warhead with super-torrid temperatures.

Presumably, then, little or no time has been lost in rethinking our anti-missile defense. But precious time has been wasted in the bomb-test suspension negotiations which have been going on in Geneva during the whole six months of the Argus "secret." No provision for a space inspection system is contained in the test ban agreement under discussion with the Russians. Such a plan was discussed by the Conference of Experts which preceded the present Geneva session, but the subject was thought too academic to incorporate into the draft agreement. Since that time, however, US scientists have devised new equipment for "observing such explosions from satellites," according to Dr. Hans Bethe, scientific adviser to the President, the AEC and the Defense Department, who was questioned on this subject by the Humphrey Disarmament Subcommittee only a few weeks ago:

> SEN. HUMPHREY: Dr. Bethe, what means of inspection do you suggest for the superhigh altitude nuclear test?
>
> DR. BETHE: I believe the best way of observing such explosions is from satellites. . . . These particular ones to be equipped with detecting equipment for the detection of the radiations which emanate from nuclear explosions. The nice point about this is that in empty space the radiations travel unhindered over terrific distances. . . .
>
> SEN. HUMPHREY: The establishment of satellite observation stations for the purpose of detection and identification of nuclear explosions in outer space is realistic, feasible?
>
> DR. BETHE: Yes.
>
> SEN. HUMPHREY: And within our capability?
>
> DR. BETHE: Definitely.

Project Argus proves that any workable test suspension agreement must include a system for detecting tests in space.

The fact that our scientists are now showing such interest in the satellite method should make this a new area in which agreement with the Soviets is sought when the Geneva talks resume on April 13.

Licensing Atomic Reactors

WHEN the United Automobile Workers protested the construction of a large atomic reactor of the fast breeder type near the homes of some of its Michigan members, it was exercising a right given the public under the Atomic Energy Act to be heard and to raise questions in advance of licensing by the AEC of any privately-built reactor. Elaborate hearings have been held on the Michigan construction permit; the case is still pending before the Commission.

But until last week, if the reactors were to be built by the AEC itself—and not privately—no construction permit was required, no notice was given the public, nor was any opportunity allowed for public hearings on the safety of a particular site, provision for waste disposal, adequacy of containment or any other health aspect of a project.

The Commission recently announced, however, that henceforth the public will be given the privilege of participating in "safety considerations" where new atomic power generating facilities are contemplated—but only facilities "which are to be operated as part of conventional electric utility systems." The privilege does not extend to reactor projects to be located at Commission installations.

The AEC's long overdue announcement is welcome. Nevertheless, it should be noted that if the privilege to be heard is the AEC's to grant, it remains the AEC's to deny. Nominally, the Commission applies the same standards in considering whether a reactor is safe, whether the

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reactor is being built by the government or by a private concern. In the first case, however, the public still has no procedural rights and in the second it does. There seems no justification for the difference. In each case, it is the health and safety of the community that is at stake. The Atomic Energy Act should be revised so as to require the AEC to subject itself to the same hearing and notice requirements—when it is building a reactor or engaging in other potentially hazardous activities such as waste disposal—that exist when it is licensing these same activities by a private company.

Less Foreign Oil

If a test of intelligence is the ability to see the relatedness of ideas, the President scored low indeed in signing an Executive Order limiting and assigning quotas for the import of oil. For his action bumps head-on into his repeated homilies on freer trade, a sympathetic concern with the needs of our allies for foreign markets, and his almost mystical devotion to keeping domestic prices in check.

On the proclamation of the order, Standard Oil of Indiana raised the price of gasoline in the Middle West; and the Texas Railroad Commission cut the amount of oil that state could produce for the month of April by more than 100,000 barrels a day—thus preparing the way for new price increases on grounds of "scarcity." The consumer has no way of knowing from his fuel bill that foreign oil is $1 cheaper a barrel than domestic oil; nor that imports of oil have in the past served to keep the price of US oil from increasing, except during the Suez crisis. Under the new program, the demand for domestic oil will rise, since the supply of imported oil will have decreased. High cost marginal wells in the US will be utilized, thus further adding to costs. And there is no consolation for the consumer who heats his house with oil and drives his car with gasoline to be told by Mr. Seaton that oil prices will be held in check through competition with other fuels such as coal and natural gas.

What is the Administration's explanation? According to Secretary of Interior Seaton, the order will "provide more oil to protect our national security." Mr. Seaton did not begin to explain (could he?) how the US will have more oil by limiting imports from Canada and Venezuela and using up its own reserves more quickly.

Senator Aiken (R, Vt.) admirably described the "classic contradictions" of the President's decision:

> You cannot control inflation and promote it at the same time. You cannot improve international relations by restricting the economy of friendly nations. You cannot insure national security by exhausting our vital national resources.

But the Executive Order still stands.

The Draper Report

The PRELIMINARY Report of the Draper Committee, set up to examine the foreign aid program, reads as though it were written, which it was, by lawyers and military officers accustomed to thinking only in conventional clichés. The clichés, unhappily, are not universally shared! The Report, in sum, says that since the US no longer enjoys an atomic monopoly, it must spend more money on military assistance. It barely considers how the *will* to fight is to be encouraged, or whether the countries to which weapons and training are to be given will likewise acquire the requisite political and economic stability.

Thoughtful objections to US military aid have been levelled not at the fact that it is military, but at its indiscriminate application. In a negative sense the Draper Report does show some discrimination: it refers by name only to Formosa, South Korea and South Vietnam and these are the three governments where military aid has clearest justification. And in the course of recommending support for the President's $2.4 billion military aid request to Congress, the Report at times appears ready to concede that certain restraints may be advisable. For example, Pakistan seems to have been in the Committee's mind when it comments, almost parenthetically, that "changes and modifications in certain of the military assistance programs can be justified in terms of more selectivity." The Committee then urges full consideration to "geographic location, to national characteristics, and to many other local, regional and historical problems."

"More selectivity" is precisely what is needed in choosing where and in what amounts to give military assistance. But the Report stops short of providing any criteria for selectivity; it does not discuss military aid in relation to local economic and political circumstances and thus falls far short of accomplishing its mission, which was to examine the entire foreign assistance program critically and provide guidelines for a more effective use of aid funds.

It should be remembered that the Committee was appointed at the instigation of those in the Administration who sought respectable, outside support for a reduction in the more unprofitable of our military commitments. But it is no secret that the Draper Committee's brief concluding reference to the need for the $700 million requested by the President this year for the Development Loan Fund was tacked on at the last minute in response to the Administration's pleas. Furthermore, its preliminary findings could not have been more poorly timed: the same week the Draper Committee recommended increases in military aid, the House Appropriations Committee denied the entire $225 million asked by the Administration to restore last year's cuts in the Development Loan Fund.

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Stabilizing the Bond Market

THE Treasury and the Federal Reserve Board have announced they are looking for ways of diminishing speculation in the government bond market. It is well that they are—not only for the sake of such investors as those who got caught last spring on a Down escalator when they thought they were on an Up, but for the sake of the stability of our entire economy. Without remedial measures, what happened last spring is apt to recur with each future swing of the economic cycle.

To appreciate the nature of present difficulties and reasons for the Treasury's anxiety, we must go back more than a year to the time when speculation caused the most thorough-going disruption of the bond market in recent history. Through the latter half of 1957, as the recession deepened, investors switched from stocks to bonds and put the government bond market in an increasingly strong position. After November of '57, when the Federal Reserve softened its hard money policy in an effort to encourage business revival, additional money became available and bond prices rose further.

The Treasury's financing in February, 1958, was highly successful, with sales of $1.727 billion of a 3.5 percent bond due in 1990; demand very shortly pushed this bond above par to a premium of 107 10/32. Those who had bought the bond at par enjoyed a quick and substantial windfall—an investor of $100,000 had a gain of $7 on each $100 in a matter of days. Word spread; a buying fever developed worthy of the Dutch tulip craze; the scramble for the Treasury's May bond offering was reminiscent of 1929.

In May, 1958, the Treasury offered two types of securities to holders of the $9.55 billion of maturing debt who wished to continue their investment. For investors with short-term requirements, it provided a one-year certificate, bearing 1¼ percent interest; for longer term investment, it offered a six year and eight months bond, bearing 2⅝ percent interest. The Treasury estimated that the current market was likely to buy up from $5-6 billion of the short-term and from $3-4 billion of the long-term security.

But if the 2⅝'s were going to behave as their February predecessors had done, a purchaser of the new bonds would be able to sell out after a few days, having made a substantial profit off the premium. As a result of this expectation, sales of the short-term issue came only to $1.8 billion; but sales of the 2⅝'s practically doubled the Treasury's estimate, reaching a total of $7.388 billion.

The frost that hit this tulip was carried on two winds. With more than $7 billion worth of the 2⅝'s having been sold, it was most unlikely that anyone would want to buy more. And after only a glimmer of a premium—just 13/32 of a point—speculators sold out. There were red faces from Bangor to San Diego. It was all in the classic '29 fashion, for the red faces belonged not only to the little fish who often get hooked, but to the treasurers of leading corporations who had a good deal of explaining to do before their boards. The current price of the 2⅝'s is just above 92—or eight below par.

The slump in bond prices due to the sell-out was accentuated by the fact that the market, at about the same time, concluded that the business upturn had come, and that now was the moment for bright money to shift back from buying bonds to buying stocks. As a consequence, when the Treasury began its next financing—in late July, 1958—the market disruption was still severe enough (when combined with the uncertainties of the Lebanon crisis) to cause the Federal Reserve System to enter the bond market for the second time since 1953 in direct support of a Treasury operation. The Fed felt obliged to pick up $1¼ billion of the bonds, in addition to the $5 billion already in hand—this out of a total Treasury offering of just over $16 billion. The fact that the Fed was able to sell these bonds shortly thereafter did not lessen the risk of an operation of this size in a period of falling bond prices.

Such is the background of the current search for means of stabilizing the market for government securities. The market is made by some 16 dealers; banks and brokers for ordinary purchases go to them, and it is through these 16 that the Fed conducts its open market operations that regulate the money supply and maintain an even keel during periods of Treasury financing; and it is through them that the Fed makes its very occasional direct interventions on behalf of Treasury offerings.

BECAUSE of this system, there is no one established price for Treasury bills, as there is for stocks on the board of the Stock Exchange. If the Fed intends a major operation in connection with bank reserves—say to meet the Christmas demand for currency—it will call all 16 of the dealers, ask what they offer and at what price, and either purchase a predetermined amount at the best bid, or be guided by the price as to the total size of the transaction. (The Fed's purchases may be for other reasons too: it may be acting on behalf of the Treasury in connection with its various trust funds—for social security, etc.; or on behalf of small banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System; or on behalf of foreign central banks or governments. This variety provides spice in the offices of Aubrey Lanston, one of the major dealers, where a bulb lights up on the desk whenever the Fed enters the market.)

In addition to being decentralized, the bond market differs from the stock market in the statutory absence of margin requirements to keep purchasers from buying entirely on credit. (For years, state and local officials—

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who have their own bonds to peddle—have urged on Congress the importance of not making their hard job of money-raising any harder.) Currently, the Stock Exchange requires a five percent down payment on bond sales that go through its members, but there is no requirement for bond-buying comparable to the margin requirement on stock purchases—now 90 percent—set up under statutory authority by the Federal Reserve.

So proposals to change present bond selling practices enough to avoid some of the red faces of last spring, by formalizing the market, by strengthening margin requirements, or by some other means, are expected to be announced by mid-year. Since monetary policy is to become a standard tool in cushioning the shocks of our fluctuating economy, free rides and windfall premiums will continue to occur at moments when Treasury financing coincides with rising bond prices. The problem is to prevent the disruption of the market by speculators hoping for a quick-kill when Treasury financing coincides with a business upturn and a shift of investor funds from bonds to stocks.

HELEN HILL MILLER

That "Ridiculous" Lar Daly FCC Ruling

FEDERAL authorities have little by little over the years shown an increasing tendency to meddle with the editorial content of radio and television news broadcasts; but it took an explosion at the White House to dramatize the issue for the public and generate a hope of remedial legislation. When the President called the FCC ruling in the Lar Daly case "ridiculous," he was saying what radio news editors had been saying to each other for several years.

The imbroglio is a product of Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act which requires stations, if they permit one legally qualified candidate to "use" the station, to "afford equal opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such broadcasting station." The controversial ruling was handed down in February when Lar Daly, a perennial Chicago office-seeker, ran in both the Democratic and Republican primaries for the mayoralty nomination. He protested to the FCC that he was entitled to equal air time whenever Mayor Richard Daley appeared on a television news broadcast. Lar Daly cited four specific film clips as the basis for his protest.

Clip No. 1 showed Mayor Daley filing his nominating papers. Clip No. 2 showed him receiving the endorsement of the Cook County Democratic Committee. When these film clips were shown on regular telecasts, Lar Daly argued that his opponent was being shown in a political act which fell within the meaning of Section 315. He therefore demanded equal time on the television screen. The FCC, without hearings but after a full discussion of the issue, voted *unanimously* to uphold Lar Daly's complaint.

Film Clip No. 3 showed Mr. Daley, acting in his official capacity as Mayor, welcoming President Frondizi of Argentina; and Clip No. 4 showed him, again in his official capacity, opening the March of Dimes. The Commission's ruling on the latter items was divided, four to three, favoring a strict construction of the statute, and again upholding Lar Daly's complaint.

In neither case did the FCC shrink from dictating the content of a news broadcast. Actually, the Commission did not issue a literal order for the offending stations to include Lar Daly in their broadcasts; instead they passed along the ruling as a matter of "information" and then filed it for review at the station's next triennial license renewal proceedings. A station would be legally free to ignore the informative ruling, but it would do so at its peril. Under this interpretation of the law, a station's only escape would be to reject, not necessarily all paid political advertising, but all objective news reports that might be presented in the public interest.

The FCC justifies its position by saying that the language of the statute is specific; but the hollowness of this argument is reflected in the four to three decision in the Daly case. The FCC argument is also based on this iffy proposition: suppose a station contrived to put a favored candidate, an incumbent, on the air every day during his campaign on the ground that his official activities were newsworthy, while at the same time totally ignoring his opponent who, not being an official, would not be engaged in activities of comparable noteworthiness? The argument is that station operators cannot be given discretion in this matter for fear that they will use their licenses to serve private interests.

In an address before the National Association of Broadcasters March 17, Chairman John Doerfer argued that the broadcast industry should not be confronted with a Hobson's choice of all or nothing. His alternative was a "substantial revision" of Section 315, "a rule of reason or one of fairness in place of the present inflexible mandate." Then, cautiously going a step further, he declared: "Some radical revisions or outright repeal proposals seem to be ripe for serious consideration."

Top management in the broadcasting industry wel-

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comed the Lar Daly decision because it became a dramatic means of showing the extremes to which federal regulation of programming could be carried. The ruling has already become an instrument for an oblique attack favoring repeal of Section 315. In Chicago, on St. Patrick's Day, for example, some broadcasters argued they were afraid to televise the St. Patrick's parade lest Mayor Daley appear and give Lar Daly another excuse to demand equal exposure. The strategy now is to play the *reductio ad absurdum* theme for all it is worth. In arguing for repeal of the controversial section, the industry contends that the editorial prerogative should be allowed to repose entirely in the hands of station management.

Repeal of Section 315 is undoubtedly the line industry spokesmen, or at least major figures in the industry, will take if the matter gets into Congressional hands. Fortunately, however, it is not at all certain that the seven FCC commissioners will support such a move. The best guess is that the agency would oppose repeal by a margin of 5 to 2, or 6 to 1. One member pointed out that an FCC station license confers a legal monopoly, something that does not exist in the newspaper business; hence, it is inherently fallacious to argue that broadcast management should have the same discretionary latitude as a publisher. Moreover, the inhibitions imposed by Section 315 have been most helpful to small local stations, enabling them to resist the pressures of big advertisers who take an active role in politics. The requirement for equal time is the loophole by which gross partisan blackmail can be avoided.

While official Washington would probably line up in opposition to a move for repeal, strong support might develop for a move to revise and liberalize Section 315. The FCC feels it is strait-jacketed, and would be glad to have more elbow room. And, while there exists a strong two-party system, some additional latitude need not necessarily lead to runaway abuses. As Doerfer pointed out in his Chicago speech, there are other restraints in the law, and it is doubtful whether a "broadcaster who must stake his license every three years against his record would take a chance of resorting to chicanery or unduly promote a favorite candidate under the guise of legitimate newscasting."

WILLIAM COSTELLO

The Long Ordeal of Co-existence

by REINHOLD NIEBUHR

FOR THE "long haul" of competitive co-existence, we require something better than the emotional attitudes engendered by the Cold War. Polemical animus is not a source of wisdom, for it fails in giving us insights about the virtues and weaknesses of both ourselves and our adversaries. This is particularly true in our own nation, where polemical attitudes are colored by the cynicism of disappointed hopes. We need not consider the disillusioned Marxists, whose dreams were mocked by the terror of Stalinism, because they had little influence on our national life. But we must think of the hopes which the genuine leaders of the nation once had, not for the Marxist utopia, but for partnership with Russia after the war. These hopes were expressed by such diverse figures as Franklin Roosevelt and Dwight Eisenhower, Henry Stimson and Sen. Arthur Vandenberg. They were rather desperate hopes; they disregarded the obvious reluctance of the war-time partnership with the Russians and obscured the dynamic of the Communist plan of world salvation, which was only momentarily deflected by the incidental collaboration with a "capitalist nation."

The charter of the United Nations expressed and was founded upon these hopes; for the charter assumes the unanimity of the great powers and rests its plans for peace upon a concurrence between them. Such unanimity has been absent almost from the beginning. The arrangements for the governments of both Germany and Berlin, exposing us as they do to Russian pressure whenever it suits Russian purposes, are so fantastic that they can be explained only in terms of illusions about our former ally and present adversary, so widely held that both the President and his chief military adviser held them in common. In a sense, this was a fortunate fact, because it has prevented extreme partisan exploitation of past mistakes. About the share of the military commander in these mistakes it is only necessary to remind the reader of what Dwight D. Eisenhower had to say about Russia in *Crusade in Europe:*

> Past relations between America and Russia were no cause to view the future with pessimism. Historically the two nations preserved an unbroken friendship since

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the founding of our nation as an independent Republic. . . . Both were free of the stigma of empire building by force.

The judgment about "empire building" was historically false, even when applied to traditional Russia. But it was even more fantastic if it was meant to be relevant to the new Russia, so soon to become the center of a new imperialism, informed by a dynamic utopian creed. Even the implied barb at our most intimate ally, Great Britain, was not a unique mistake. It was the stereotype of American attitudes, despite two war-time alliances. Clearly we are disappointed partners, who mistook a military marriage of convenience for a marriage between kindred souls. Our emotions are now frantic because our hopes were high. But these emotions must not blind us to the present sober obligation of measuring both our own resources and those of our adversary in the fateful encounter in which we are involved.

We must think particularly of comparative political and economic resources in the struggle, for these will undoubtedly dominate our history and that of the world for decades to come. At the same time, we dare not under-value the military dimension of the East-West conflict, though for our present purposes we can tentatively dismiss that part of the encounter by acknowledging that such peace as we enjoy (if that is the word for it) rests upon a "balance of terror"; and that we cannot afford to fall too far behind the Russians in maintaining the balance, lest they push us to the limits of our patience because they erroneously believe that we are not prepared to join issue with them, either in limited wars or in the ultimate conflict.

In the realm of politics it is important to recognize that the struggle is not so simply a contest between despotism and freedom as many complacently assume. Admittedly, the Communist system is still totalitarian. The political leadership still dominates the whole of Soviet life and still forces the whole of the culture to conform to the standards of "socialist realism" which means the glorification of the political *status quo*. But what is developing now cannot be understood either in terms of analogy with Hitler's despotism or in comparison with Stalin's reign of terror. Khrushchev may become another Stalin; the 21st Party Congress certainly gave evidence of disquieting obeisance to the autocrat. But it is well to notice the difference: Compare the crude backward nation in which Stalin ruled and the emerging dynamic society in which Khrushchev achieved his eminence. That society is dominated by a Communist creed, but it also is the prey of contests of interest between competing oligarchies—economic, military and political. Essentially Khrushchev has triumphed thus far because he has shrewdly used the still powerful political oligarchy as his instrument. He beat the rising economic managers, who were behind Malenkov, partly by destroying their chain of command to Moscow in his famous decentralization maneuver, which placed the local industrial manager under the local party boss. He also defeated Malenkov, by the trick of restoring the war-time hero of the Army, Marshal Zhukov. But when that worthy, seemingly secure as a member of the presidium, tried to make military power independent of the party, Khrushchev used party fears and the jealousies of Zhukov's war buddy Marshal Konov, to overthrow the military hero. Before all this happened he engaged in the hazardous venture of destroying the Stalin myth, both for the sake of extricating himself from the taint of Stalinism and of assuring the budding "bourgeoisie"—the classes of oligarchs of the new dynamic society—that they would not be again subject to Stalin's capricious terror. He also gave something to the "common man" of Russia by swiping the consumer promises of the defeated Malenkov, without making the mistake of arousing the fears of the military oligarchy by invading heavy industry for the sake of the consumer. He has since improved his position with the Russian consumers by mixing plausible and implausible promises, including a 40 percent rise in wages, the reduction of hours to 35 per week and a general rise of gross national product by 80 percent in seven years. The implausibility of the promises are slightly obscured by the enormous achievements of Russian technics, by the five percent annual increase in productivity and by the inability of any of the lesser oligarchs effectively to challenge Khrushchev's figures.

Thus, his achievements are those of a shrewd politician but of a politician working in an oligarchic community, and therefore comparable to, say, Sir Robert Walpole's achievements in the context of the aristocratic politics of England at the beginning of the 18th Century. It would be foolish to detect here the beginnings of an "open society." The Russian system still tolerates a monopoly of power, which Khrushchev has, in a sense, aggravated by preserving or restoring the monopoly of the political oligarchy. In subordinating the military oligarchy, Communism has achieved a unique distinction in the history of dictatorships. And by subordinating the economic oligarchy, Communism probably prevents the rise of a class with an independent source of power—an important element in the rise of democratic society.

Khrushchev, as a versatile politician, may have been the agent of these developments, but his personal achievements should not obscure the historical context which made them possible. For Khrushchev is presiding over a nation very much on the make. The Russian society is fermenting with the dynamic possibilities of a technical civilization. It will probably be a vexatious oligarchy for decades to come. But it cannot turn back, even as Khrushchev could not exercise Stalin's terror on the technicians whose achievements have added to the prestige of the Communist boss. It is furthermore disquiet-

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ing to realize that our free society does not have the attractive power for the new nations which we attribute to it. The newly independent nations may merely exchange the restraints of the collectivism of a pastoral or feudal society for the technical collectivism of Communism. Communism has, moreover, become a political movement appealing to a whole people and to their rulers, and not simply to the "oppressed." It promises them quick results in industrialization and the abundance of a technical civilization.

The stability which each new nation seeks is, furthermore, not as obviously compatible with freedom as we often assume. Freedom, justice and stability have been wedded only in Western Europe and the British Commonwealth, and even in Western Europe the record is not too impressive. France has not digested its revolution in a century and a half. Germany is just beginning a new life after a terrible interlude. Italy is still unstable.

Outside of Europe our democratic allies are not exactly exemplars of an "open society." We may still remember the pious resolutions with which the Batista dictatorship supported us in the United Nations. Certain of the Latin American nations are dictatorships. The fallen Iraqi Government, lynch-pin of the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East, was a dictatorship, as is the government which supplanted it. Our intimate ally, which pretends to be China on the island of Formosa, is a police state. The democratic achievements of the Rhee Government in Korea are not too impressive. Vietnam, the brand plucked from the burning, is strongly anti-Communist but certainly not democratic. In short, the record of the "free world" proves that the compatibility between freedom, justice and stability is a rare achievement. The nontechnical world will be pardoned if it regards the achievement as beyond its present competence.

In the field of economic competition our handicaps seem even more disturbing than in the political field. The launching of the earth satellites, culminating in the achievement of the moon or sun satellite, was the Soviet Union's dramatic announcement to the world that it had mastered the technics which are the foundation of industrial abundance. The once "backward" Russians had in four decades entered the circle of technically competent nations. Capitalism and democracy were cherished in the 19th Century, not only for their freedom, but as the prerequisites of technical competence. If Communism now steals the "emperor's clothes" of this prestige and sets itself up as the necessary prerequisite of industrialization, one must recognize a certain ironic justice in the vagaries of history, and realize that the claim will seem plausible to some of the budding nations of the awakened continents. We have not noted sufficiently that Communism, which once promised utopia to the "downtrodden" of the industrial nations, has been transmuted and now promises industrial power and independence to the "colonial" nations, meanwhile exploiting the present or residual resentments of once subject peoples against Western imperialism. Western imperialism was morally ambiguous rather than purely exploitative; and none of the new nations could have achieved integral nationhood without the linguistic, technical and legal means of integration supplied by their former masters. Yet these subject nations did experience the white man's racial arrogance, and they cannot be expected to discriminate too sharply now between the creative and exploitative aspects of the former imperialism. Nor can they easily discern the perennial pattern of imperialism in the bland promises of help from the Communist "big brother."

While these Communist promises and performances contain many dishonesties, it cannot be denied that the help of a once backward nation, offering both economic and technical assistance to the now backward nations, can be impressive. It is particularly so since the Russian oligarchy in its foreign-aid program does not have to deal with a budget conscious electorate. It can barter its productive capacity with other nations so long as it allows moderate improvement in the living standards of its own people, who are not accustomed to the standards of comfort which Western nations, particularly our own, regard as their god-ordained right.

Our nation, at least its most thoughtful citizens and leaders, is becoming increasingly aware that this economic competition is the paramount issue confronting us. But are our leaders? They are not incapable of occasional eloquent statements on the importance of the economic competition, but usually they are content to picture our struggle with Communism in simpler moral terms. For example, just before his illness, Secretary Dulles assured the American Bar Association that our nation is dedicated to the high goal of establishing "the world rule of law" which substitutes "law and justice for force," while the Communists use the United Nations for propagating their conception that "laws are means by which those in power suppress or destroy their enemy."

Such official explanations of the essence of the struggle have the same relation to realities as fairy tales have to facts. We need not be the paragons of virtue and Communists need not be the devils which we and they are in the imagination of some to make our contest with Communism a fateful one. It is also apparent that that contest can be successful only if we are armed, not only with a sense of the virtue of our cause, but with a full realization of the hazards we face in the military, economic and political realms in this struggle; and only if we are fully conscious of the political and moral ambiguities in which we are involved. If we fail in these marks of maturity, the alleged flexibilities of an open society will degenerate into an inflexible stance of moral complacency, somewhat akin to the original Communist dogmatism.

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A Conversation with
EDMUND WILSON

"We Don't Know Where We Are"

by HENRY BRANDON

Mr. Wilson is considered the *cher maitre* of American letters. He is perhaps best known for his literary journalism, a good part of which was printed originally in *The New Republic,* of which he was an associate editor from 1926-31. He has also, over the past four decades, written plays, poems and novels, as well as editing *The Crack-up,* compiled after the death of his gifted Princeton classmate, F. Scott Fitzgerald. His works include *This Room and This Gin and These Sandwiches, The Dead Sea Scrolls, Memoirs of Hecate County* and *To the Finland Station.* Since 1944, his reviews have been published in *The New Yorker.* Mr. Brandon's interview first appeared in *The Sunday Times* of London.

BRANDON: Stuart Hampshire, in his review of *The American Earthquake,* in *The Sunday Times,* said that in your attitude to Europe you alternate between moods of chauvinistic contempt and moods of reverence.

WILSON: That's quite true—a good point on his part. And he also said it's rather the same attitude as that of the old Russian intellectuals, and that's perfectly true. I think that there's always been a good deal in common between the Russians and us. In reading Turgenev lately, I found that he would write to his Russian friends how awful the Europeans were, but that when he was back at home he would brood about how awful Russia was.

BRANDON: What is the basis of your disillusionment with Europe?

WILSON: It's the same thing as that of the Russians. It's the feeling of a new country. You find it in all of our literature from the very beginning, especially in something like Walt Whitman. We felt that they'd had it in Europe; that they were in a decline. The time had come for us to show the world something better, or something new.

BRANDON: But what assurance of new nourishment do you have from here?

WILSON: It's been just that any kind of new start has always meant new hope.

BRANDON: But do you see any possibilities?

WILSON: Well, I think we are all in a further stage now—the whole world is getting to be more alike in certain ways. We're all having to deal with more or less the same kind of society, so that national literatures and all that are becoming less important. Obviously Europe and America are merging more all the time, and even in our peculiar relation to the Soviet Union we're getting more and more alike all the time. There are moments when I think the great menace is the time when we'll discover that we understand each other perfectly.

BRANDON: You're talking about political relations now?

WILSON: No, no—cultural, too! Russian literature both old and new has had a great deal of influence here.

BRANDON: Apropos this increasing similarity all over the world, it seems to me that you and Malraux have quite a lot in common; you both have a world point of view, a universal interest.

WILSON: I think that's true, and I tremendously admire Malraux. I think, in fact, that he's the greatest living European writer, if not the greatest Western writer. His books about art are extremely original works. His conception of "the imaginary museum," in which you have pictures from all sorts of civilizations and periods put together so that you can study them side by side, has really revolutionized books on art. Malraux's text, I think, is as important as any of his fiction. It's no more merely a book about art than *War and Peace* is merely a novel about the Napoleonic wars, or Gibbon a mere history of the fall of Rome, or *Das Kapital* merely a work on economics. Like these others, it's really a discussion of the destiny of man on the earth.

BRANDON: When you write about literature, do politics influence your selection?

WILSON: No. There are certain kinds of writers that are more congenial to me than others. There are writers that I think are very gifted that I haven't any special interest in reading—for example, D. H. Lawrence. I think he was an extraordinary writer, and yet I have very little appetite to read him. Thomas Wolfe, of whom some people in this country have a tremendously high opinion, is completely unreadable to me, but I've read enough of him to know that he did have a good deal of talent.

BRANDON: How would you define your taste?

WILSON: Well, I suppose that, in general, I don't like loose or romantic writing. That is partly what puts me off in the cases of Lawrence and Wolfe.

BRANDON: What do you think of the standards of literary criticism today?

WILSON: I don't think about those things AT ALL! Literary criticism is a department of literature for me, and when I read literary critics I read them as literature; the others I can't read at all. I never think of myself, for

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instance, as a literary critic; I think of myself simply as a writer and a journalist. I write about things that interest me—just now I'm writing about the New York State Indians. I'm as much interested in history as I am in literature.

BRANDON: If you compare the standards of American literature with European today, do you think the creativeness in the United States is greater?

WILSON: I think that in Europe the French have been holding up marvelously. There's been more vitality in French literature than anywhere else. Their wonderful literary tradition is stronger than that of any other country. But it's rather hard for me to tell about America, because I grew up in a period that was probably one of our best literary periods. I think we've had two great literary periods in this country. One was in the fifties of the last century, when you had Hawthorne, Emerson, Thoreau, Melville, Walt Whitman. These writers, as well as lesser writers like Oliver Wendell Holmes and Longfellow, were all pretty well known in England. Whitman was even something of a sensation. And then there was a lapse. The period after the Civil War was a bad period for literature, the time when the American writers and painters and other artists in fact emigrated to France and England. It was the period of Whistler and Henry James. But after that a whole new cultural era began for the United States. It got under way slowly and really came to a boil at the time when I was in college—1912-16. So the period of the twenties, which was awful in some ways, was a good period for literature and art in America. We were preoccupied with American matters, and the whole situation was, again, more like the early part of the 19th Century before the Civil War—a period which had certain things in common with the early phases of the Soviet.

At the time I was in Russia, in 1932, they were going through a relatively liberal phase—they were talking about how in a cultural way they had to learn from the West and learn from the bourgeois world. They were making the new humanity in the Soviet Union, but they had to know about the best that had been done in the West and use it for their own purposes. That was almost exactly our point of view in the early 19th Century.

Well, then, in the twenties this idea somewhat revived, and although a great many Americans still went abroad we were all preoccupied with American literature; we were trying to make something of America, to make an American Culture. We studied German Expressionism and then tried to adapt this to American life and produce American plays that exploited these devices. Some of O'Neill is based on that, you know—a play like *The Great God Brown*. And Dos Passos went to Russia and met the Russian writers; and it was evidently partly from them that he got the idea of writing novels and plays that would deal with groups and not individuals—he tried to adapt that to American life.

The thing that's upsetting now—in politics and literature both—is that from the moment we lose the idea that we are concentrating on this country—and that idea seems completely to have gone by the board—we don't know where we are any more.

Nowadays, you read quantities of things about the American tradition and what it consists of, and actually I think a great deal of it doesn't make very much sense.

One of the things that seems to me strangest is that everybody from England always thinks that we're terribly lonely in America. I'm not conscious of being lonely at all. But since we don't have any cultural capital—like London or Paris—we're scattered around all over. But it is only geographically that most American writers are solitary.

BRANDON: But do you think that out of the European influence American writers were able to develop something that could really be called "American culture"?

WILSON: I don't know, I'm sure. I really know very little about contemporary writing. I did read one book of Kerouac's: *The Subterraneans*. He has traces of talent, I think, but it seems rather feeble and decadent. I think that Salinger is very good—he's one of the few I've read. The writing of my own generation seems to have reached Europe recently, and they have the illusion that all this is new—actually the writers they like are mostly between 60 and 70.

BRANDON: Today's "lost generation" in England we call the angry young men—

WILSON: I think that our "beat" generation here more or less corresponds to them. These anti-social writers are typical of the world in its present state. The best of them is Jean Genet, the French writer, who carries the anti-social attitude farther than any of the rest and also has more ability. I think that after Malraux he's probably the most important French novelist.

BRANDON: What do you think generated this "anti-social" reaction in our period?

WILSON: I think there's been a general dissatisfaction with the kind of world we live in. In the thirties, there was a tendency for the various kinds of intellectuals to react against it by way of Marxism, and, of course, the great hope of the Marxists was the Soviet Union. But the Soviet Union turned sour on them, so there was nothing for them to believe in at all.

I was born in the 19th Century, and, like most people born in the 19th Century, I still have—entirely instinctively—the belief in human progress, the conviction that the world won't fall apart, the faith in the value of reform. But it is obvious that the people born later are now quite remote from this.

Many young people who, in my time, would have gone in for the humanities in college, now go in for physics and don't have any political ideas at all—or they go in for psychiatry or something of the kind.

Oppenheimer is a very interesting case of this. He went in for mathematics and physics, and he lived, as he says,

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in a completely abstract intellectual world; then he got interested in Communism, but it was also something completely abstract for him; then when he had to abandon that, he went back to his abstract world of physics and worked at these confounded bombs. From the point of view of anybody of my generation this career makes no sense at all, yet it's typical of Oppenheimer's age-group.

BRANDON: But isn't it partly the Welfare State—after all, the United States is also a Welfare State—that makes it so much more difficult to find new goals to reach for, to fight for?

WILSON: Yes of course—but I haven't any solution to propose. We had something that could be called a Welfare State in the early days of the Roosevelt Administration. But then the whole thing turned into a big war-making exploit, and that's what it still is. I'm very unsympathetic with America's present role in the world and its effects on our life at home, and I think that there's a good deal of such dissatisfaction. In the case of the "beat" generation, it is not surprising that they should be completely anti-social—they have gone in for Zen Buddhism and things like that, which divorce them from social reality.

BRANDON: Perhaps mass education here is contributing to this.

WILSON: It's bound to, of course. The whole idea of equality is something that doesn't work beyond a certain point. The Declaration of Independence says that "all men are created equal," but it goes on to specify the equal right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This is a very sound formulation, because it *is* true that everybody ought to have a chance to live, and to make the best use he can of such abilities as he possesses, to enjoy himself to the best of his capacity. And I think beyond that the ideal of equality is rather a misleading one.

Once these rudimentary rights have been guaranteed, you will not be able to get people excited about the ideal of equality. The equality that people fight for is really the chance to excel. And since different people are variously gifted, I'm in favor of unequal schools for students of unequal abilities. But assignment to a higher or lower school—or department of a school—should of course depend solely on ability, not upon race or color.

The appearance of this phrase "the Establishment" in England is very significant and interesting. I don't think that in this country we could talk about anything equivalent. I'm not sure that they could in any other country. It's as if institutions in England were turning out to have a strength that is even independent of the old hierarchy of class.

BRANDON: What do you think should be the role of the drama critic?

WILSON: I believe that the kind of criticism which formulates a recipe for the right kind of works, for masterpieces, is always sure to be quite useless. The critic who uses it compares the actual works that come to his attention with ideal works that don't exist, except in his own mind, and this is a perfectly useless kind of criticism. Aristotle didn't formulate his rules for tragedy until years after the great Greek tragedies had been written, and the critic can't provide a formula and expect the artist to fulfill it.

BRANDON: How do you feel about English literature since the war?

WILSON: I don't want to criticize the English in such a way as to imply a superiority on our part in America, because I don't think that what we're producing is terribly interesting or distinguished now. I think that something has happened in England that's very curious. For one thing, in the last century the complaint of writers who had been influenced by the French was always that English novels were in general lacking in form. Whereas you have in England now, it seems to me, a highly developed sense of form and style, but you don't have any such substantial novels as you had in the 19th Century. The whole thing seems to me to have dwindled. You have a lot of people who are quite good, who write rather small-scale novels. They're sent over, as my wife says, like a lot of little cakes that we eat.

Actually, I read more contemporary English fiction than I do American fiction, because the American stuff is likely to be badly written and extremely formless. But the English stuff is mostly on a much smaller scale than Dickens and Thackeray, George Eliot and Meredith and Hardy—or Bennett and Wells for that matter.

Another curious thing about English writing is the present standardization of the language of prose. This language has lost its richness. Think of the inventiveness of English prose. Virginia Woolf is the last great example of it. But this richness survives in the poets. Auden and Day Lewis and Louis MacNeice have a large and varied vocabulary and a wonderful command of language.

BRANDON: You said earlier in our conversation that French literature is much more vital than English literature today.

WILSON: Yes. In the first place, the French literary tradition is so important, it's so old and well developed, and it's taken so seriously that it's very hard to discourage. But another thing is simply that the French were not involved in the war to the extent that the English and the Germans were—German literature seems to have been non-existent by the time the war was over, except for Junger and Brecht.

Also I sometimes feel there's a tendency to boycott writers who left England before the war. It seems to me that Auden and Whitehead have been certainly the greatest Englishmen in the literary world between the wars—I exclude Yeats and Joyce and Shaw as Irishmen. But Auden and Whitehead are very, very English, though both of them have an international point of view. They both came to live in America, and I get the impression, especially in connection with Auden, that their pictures have been turned to the wall in England.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Nightmare of History

by Delmore Schwartz

THE ADMIRER and student of Joyce had every reason to feel that a dramatization of parts of *Ulysses* was likely to be a distortion and a dilution. My own feelings were such as to keep me from going to the off-Broadway production. I know that Zero Mostel was a wonderful comedian and that Joyce's work often reveals itself most fully when spoken aloud. Nevertheless, it seemed impossible to believe that the longest episode—and the most complicated, the most obscure and the most obscene—could be translated to the stage. Now that I have heard comments on the production, and read Marjorie Barkentin's script, it is clear that I was entirely wrong.

Ulysses in Nighttown, by James Joyce, dramatized and transposed by Marjorie Barkentin under the supervision of Padraic Colum (Modern Library; $.95)

For example, the effect of the production upon some of the writers of the Beat Generation was extraordinary; instead of dismissing Joyce as old hat and a minor figure compared, let us say, to Gautama Buddha and Jack Kerouac, a new curiosity about *Ulysses* itself came to the fore: several beat characters interrupted their studies of Zen for a time and actually read or reread the Nighttown episode of Joyce's masterpiece. It should be said immediately that the dramatic version, unlike most plays in print, makes good reading in itself and might very well be an excellent primer for those who have hitherto been intimidated or discouraged by the exegetes of Joyce, most of whom tend to over-interpret him. Joyce, more than any other modern author, *is* often readable, just as he is marvelously funny and delightfully lyrical.

It is worth remarking that one New York critic of the production told millions of readers that he himself had been very much bewildered by it: his perplexity was so great, he said, that he wished he had been able to consult an official of the Bagel Union as to the meaning of the play which was performed in the same building as the offices of that union. The suggestion might have delighted the creator of Leopold Bloom, but it was not very likely to attract any one to the theatre. It is quite possible that the critic was more in the dark than he supposed, since he failed to inform his readers that *Ulysses in Nighttown* has some of the qualities which made him praise Jayne Mansfield and recommend *Will Success Spoil Rock Hunter?*

The important thing about the dramatization is its relation to the reading of Joyce. Anything which persuades the off-Broadway theatregoer and the reading public that Joyce's work is unique, exciting, and sufficiently clear to be read as entertainment is valuable. This must be said again and again precisely because the prevailing tendency of criticism is to deal with *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* as if they are written in code. Joyce himself encouraged this tendency when, after the publication of *Ulysses*, he became aware of the fact that he had overestimated the powers or the patience of the educated reader.

The history of the interpretation of Joyce's work is a fabulous comedy in itself: at one point Pablo Picasso was so irritated by the number of experts on the hidden meanings of Joyce's two masterpieces that he remarked: "An *obscur* whom everyone understands!"

JOYCE is sometimes irritating, but the rewards, for the patient reader, are astonishing. Thus the most difficult and recondite passages in the Nighttown episode are drunken hallucinations and wild poetic fantasies which are bound to be misunderstood as self-indulgent dadaism by the most educated reader when he reads *Ulysses* for the first time. Joyce tried to provide an interpretation of whatever is obscure in his novel—sometimes by repeating the same incident and placing it in the mind of another character—but at a first reading, these devices of explanation are often overlooked or unrecognized. Everything which occurs in the Nighttown episode is a development of something which has occurred in a previous episode, but the development is often so extreme that one must look back or remember what one has already read. The virtue of Miss Barkentin's dramatization is that it makes some of the connections clear and by means of omission and juxtaposition presents the narrative line of the entire episode in such a way that it ought to be lucid and interesting to the most uninstructed reader. Joyce's expositors, for the most part, make what is already quite complicated more complicated than ever.

THIS should justify a brief attempt to say something about Joyce's work as a whole. He is perhaps more than any other modern author the one who drew strength and sustenance from various forms of popular culture, from comic strips, music hall comedians, newspapers, advertising slogans and pornography. He did not participate in any of the illusions about popular and mass culture which were current during his career and have recurred in one or another form, since his death. But the speech of the people, however vulgar and inaccurate, was too important to be disregarded by a writer with Joyce's genius for language, and sensitivity to historical change.

Joyce as a human being was continually shocked by the words other human beings used and by their actions. "History is a nightmare from which I am trying to awake," Stephen Dedalus tells a schoolmaster in *Ulysses*. The history of the 20th Century is recorded in the nightmares of the Nighttown scene and the nightmare of all history is one of the terrors from which the dreamer who is the hero of *Finnegans Wake* is trying to awake again and again; in both masterpieces, Joyce's genius and courage led him to try to exorcise the monsters of history and of experience by confrontation and incantation. The terrifying nightmare is transformed by the magic of language, and by the sufficient grace of style and narrative into

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an experience which one has suffered and survived and from which one is able to draw new strength to face whatever new nightmares the future may hold. There is a good deal more to be said about Joyce as one of the greatest of all writers and about Marjorie Barkentin's dramatic version of one of the greatest of books. But most of what there is to say ought to be read after and not before the reader has read *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake* several times, particularly since the latter work grows out of its predecessor and extends its meaningfulness.

VARIOUS critics damned *Ulysses* as obscene, said that Joyce was a man of genius who lacked good taste, and described Stephen Dedalus as an impossibly sentimental prig. And the one respect in which Marjorie Barkentin's script is not all that it should be is in relation to the character of Stephen Dedalus. By the time that Joyce was writing *Ulysses,* he understood the shortcomings of Stephen Dedalus as a young man; he was then the same age as Leopold Bloom, and he identified himself with Ulysses and Bloom far more than with Telemachus and Dedalus. By the time that he wrote *Finnegans Wake,* Joyce had faced the annihilating fury of history he saw himself as H. C. Earwicker, as Noah, and as Everyman: nothing human was alien to him and the hallucinations of the Nighttown episode were soon to be exaggerated and made actual in Nazi Germany. And by now no one, except those who are alienated from reality, can fail to understand the profound anxiety which makes *Ulysses in Nighttown* what it is. Anyone who is not disturbed by the nightmare of history, has something wrong with him.

Nevertheless, the nightmare of history requires some explanation, even though every year of the 20th Century, during Joyce's lifetime and since his death, has made the experience of nightmare more and more painful for everyone. From 1904 until 1914, Joyce himself was unable to get the publisher who had accepted *Dubliners* to print it. Joyce says in a letter to Bennett Cerf printed in 1934, that when he finally succeeded in getting *Dubliners* published "some very kind person bought out the entire edition and had it burnt in Dublin"—a new and private *auto-da-fé,* a private inquisition which foreshadowed Hitler's burning of all books which did not seem favorable to the Nazi régime. During World War I, *The Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* was published, at long last, in England and America. Joyce began to write *Ulysses* in 1914, in Trieste, just as World War I began. Its serialization in America resulted in the prosecution of the editors who were publishing it and the banning of the work—or its "prohibition," Joyce's word, until December 1933, the same month that Prohibition itself was repealed. The writing of *Ulysses* continued throughout World War I. Eugene Jolas wrote, (in *Partisan Review,* in 1941) that one evening in Paris Joyce said to him "Over on those tracks there the fate of *Ulysses* was decided in 1915." "He referred," Jolas added, "to the fact that in [an Austrian border town] he had almost been prevented from crossing into Switzerland during World War I." *Ulysses,* for the most part, was written in Zurich, and this is one reason that Jung, who practiced nearby, began to influence Joyce. It was perhaps the Nighttown episode which made Jung say that Joyce had to write *Ulysses* in order to keep himself from insanity. And during this period, in the evening, Joyce sat in the same bar as Lenin, another exile and the prototype of the Russian general in *Finnegans Wake.* The writing of *Finnegans Wake*—in the sense of its *conscious* composition—began in Paris in 1924—the same year that Lenin died and Hitler was released from prison in Munich.

Here again, Eugene Jolas' report of what Joyce said when *Finnegans Wake* appeared is illuminating: "For Joyce himself, *Finnegans Wake* had prophetic significance. Finn Mac Cool, the Finnish-Norwegian-Irish hero of the tale seemed to him to be becoming alive . . . [Joyce] said:

> . . . After the publication of my book, Finland came into the foreground suddenly. First by the awarding of the Nobel prize to a Finnish writer, and then by the political door. The most curious comment I have received on the book is a symbolical one from Helsinki, where, as foretold by the prophet, the Finn again wakes, and volunteer Buckleys (the young hero who shoots the Russian general in *Finnegans Wake*) are hurrying from all sides to shoot the Russian general.

In 1959, a new "Russian general" is attacking the moon, Western civilization, literature, and we are all still trying to wake from the growing nightmare of history, and from the hallucinatory degradation of Nighttown. *Ulysses* is, among other things, a history of the nightmare of history, and *Finnegans Wake* is, as Joyce himself says, a letter to the New World, a guided missile, a text of hope addressed to the future and to America and "to that ideal reader suffering from ideal insomnia," that unborn reader who has remained awake or has awakened once and for all from the nightmare of history.

"The absinthe-minded professor," as Joyce calls himself in *Finnegans Wake* continues to be right again. And the meaning of his words in *Finnegans Wake* continues to grow: "Humph is in his doge. Words weigh no more to him than raindrops to Rethfernhim. Which we all like, Rain. When we sleep. Drops. But wait until our sleeping. Drops."

Deities and Beasts

TALL Atlas, Jupiter, Hercules, Thor,
Just like the antic pagan gods of yore,
Make up a too-erratic pantheon
For mortal men to be dependent on.

I much prefer, myself, the humble RAT,
The tiny Terrier, the short Hawk that
Makes secret flight, and the Sparrow, whose fall
Is never mentioned in the press at all.

JOHN UPDIKE

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Our National Doctor Bill

by John G. Knecht

RICHARD CARTER here outlines the American Medical Association's record and quotes its spokesmen so devastatingly that one ends up valuing the "sacred doctor-patient relationship" chiefly as a means of giving the practitioner a sharp one across the jowls with his empty wallet. In short, the AMA's prime concern is money not health, and it at least condones kickbacks, overcharging, unnecessary operations and malpractice to get it.

The Doctor Business, by Richard Carter (Doubleday; $4).

Why? Because, Mr. Carter says, ". . . the prevailing fee-based relations between private physicians and private patients are inefficient and uneconomical. Furthermore, they are scientifically obsolescent. They are so far behind the times, they have actually become a deterrent to health."

Fee-for-service is the devil, and it is nurtured by the AMA, supported (generally) by physicians, toadied to by lawmaking bodies and revered by politicians of every persuasion. "Medical corruption is caused by fee-for-service and it is common knowledge wherever physicians drink coffee and swap clinical details," Mr. Carter says. And these split fees, this insurance fund plundering and acceptance of commissions from drug stores and diagnostic laboratories are *not* restricted to "the unethical few."

In confirmation is a special AMA report, published in 1954 but now relegated to the dust bin, which acknowledges the existence of improper practices and traces them to the competition for fees. It says, in effect, that state and county medical societies do little or nothing to discipline physicians who try to exploit the fee system by exploiting patients.

A correlative to fee-splitting is unnecessary surgery. The national health insurance survey by the Health Information Foundation and the National Opinion Research Center found that people covered by surgical insurance undergo almost twice as many operations as those not covered. "Making all allowances for the fact that insured people are more likely to seek medical attention than uninsured people, and considering that there is a difference between 'elective' and 'emergency' surgery, it is impossible that all the additional surgical service rendered to holders of insurance is medically necessary or even justifiable."

In its January 31, 1953, issue, *The Journal of the AMA*, in a study of 6,248 hysterectomies, reported that one-third "seemed to be unnecessary." "An appalling number of patients aged 20 to 29 . . . had no disease whatever." In individual hospitals the percentage of unnecessary hysterectomies has been as high as 66.

But *The Doctor Business* offers a nice balance between adverse criticism and credit where credit is due. We are, for example, reminded of Abraham Flexner's classic 1910 report, *Medical Education in the United States and Canada*, which documented the parlous state of our medical schools and led to the elimination of diploma mills, the improvement of medical training and the standardization of state medical licensure. The AMA of yesteryear also helped formulate strong public health laws, gave authoritative advice on the training of hospital nurses and technicians, influenced the passage of pure food and drug legislation, and exposed medical cultism and quackery. That was the AMA in its virile youth.

THIRTY-TWO years ago the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care, established under the direction of Dr. Ray Lyman Wilbur, then president of Stanford University and past president of the AMA, recommended that:

1. Medical care be rendered largely by hospital-based groups of physicians and related health personnel, to organize scientifically skills and facilities for service of the highest quality and greatest efficiency.

2. Costs be met through group prepayment, either under voluntary insurance or taxation or both, but allowing those who prefer traditional fee-for-service medicine to continue to purchase service that way.

3. Public health services be extended until available to the entire population.

These suggestions are as good now as they were in 1927, to paraphrase Mr. Carter, who elucidates by describing many group health plans, including Kaiser-Permanente, the Health Insurance Plan of Greater New York and others which incorporate group practice with group purchase.

Like others advocating substantial social change, this book will gain only a small fraction of the readers it deserves —and they will for the most part be doctors and laymen who already at least suspect the truth of Mr. Carter's thesis. But it is a book worth reading and then passing on to your family physician.

TEACHERS

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Notes on Contributors

DELMORE SCHWARTZ' newest book of poems will be published in the fall. JOHN UPDIKE is the author of *The Poorhouse Fair*. JOHN G. KNECHT edits a medical trade journal.

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MOVIES

The Return of Marilyn Monroe

BETWEEN an audience and a good film a certain confidence is quickly established. This is especially true of comedies. The first two or three minutes are enough to tell you whether a comic film is going to be a dud; the first eight or ten minutes are enough to establish this confidence. In it the audience implies: "We recognize that we are in good hands. Take over." In addition to the fun the picture provides, there is an extra pleasure in having found a good film and knowing it while you're enjoying it. It is staggering to contemplate how many millions of people around the world are going to feel that way about *Some Like It Hot*. This new Marilyn Monroe - Jack Lemmon - Tony Curtis film is a lulu.

Some Like It Hot (United Artists); *The Eighth Day of the Week* (Continental); *Taiga* (Bakros).

In terms of comic devices there is very little in the film that is original, but the use of the material is delightful. In Chicago, 1929, Lemmon and Curtis are indigent musicians who accidentally witness the St. Valentine's Day Massacre. The gang searches for them to kill them, and they don't even have the money to get out of town. In desperation they borrow wigs and women's clothes and, in disguise, take jobs with an all-girl band going to Florida. The singer with the band is Miss Monroe. Their male reactions to her, while frantically trying to remain disguised, and other males' reactions to them in female clothes, constitute the nub of the plot.

Lately, in the wave of sentimentality that always seems to follow success, much has been written to the effect that Miss Monroe is not merely attractive but also has gifts as a comedienne. She has few. She is not nearly as good an actress, for instance, as her Continental counterpart, Miss Bardot; she lacks the French girl's voice, verve, moderate technical proficiency, and certainly lacks her range. But by now Miss Monroe and her advisers have learned where her strengths lie, and this role is superbly designed to conceal the weaknesses and display the strengths—physical and personal. One aspect of her superiority over such pneumatic dummies as Jayne Mansfield, Anita Ekberg, and Diana Dors is that she has learned not to take sex seriously. As a performer she kids sex; and as a character, in this film, she is so humble about her attractiveness that her effect is equal parts sexual and endearing. It is rumpled, unpretentious, good-hearted sex.

Jack Lemmon is easily one of the most accomplished American actors of his generation. From his first films he has demonstrated technical and temperamental gifts for comedy that are extraordinary; in several recent TV appearances he has shown his ability at the dramatic. His deft, hilariously agonized performance here sets the tone for the picture. In the colloquial vein, and perhaps in others, Lemmon's future should prove interesting in the extreme.

Tony Curtis has neither the innate endowment nor, as yet, the acquired skill of Lemmon, but he has improved so enormously since his first appearance that the very fact of his improvement seems to compensate for the difference between the two men. *The Sweet Smell of Success, The Defiant Ones,* and this film represent a growth of which Curtis can be proud and to which audiences are responding.

However its three stars would probably agree that this picture owes its continuous bubble to Billy Wilder, who collaborated on the script, produced and directed. With easy mastery, he has captured much of the scuttling, broad, vaguely surrealist feeling of the best silent comedies. Let dullards deplore the fact that Wilder's ability is lavished on trivia. No one claims that pleasure is, in itself, the highest aim of comedy, but are there many people with such an abundance of completely pleasant hours in their lives that they can afford to bypass these two?

A PAIR of grim, less perfect films comes to us from Germany. *The Eighth Day of the Week*, made from Marek Hlasko's novel of the same name, deals with Gomulka's Poland. It was made simultaneously in both Polish and German versions, and the Polish government, we are told, has suppressed the first version. It tells of two young lovers in crowded Warsaw who cannot find a place to consummate their love. She lives with her parents in a small crowded apartment, his bomb-weakened house has collapsed.

As we follow their attempts to borrow apartments or find temporary shelter (including a silly color sequence in a department store at night—a vulgarized theft from *Modern Times*), we are given a cross-section of the hopelessness and alcoholic apathy of the Polish people today. But to symbolize a nation's plight by means of a search for an amorous couch verges eventually on the ludicrous; and the execution of the film (excepting Sonja Ziemann's performance as the girl) is in most ways banal, as was the novel. In mood and effect it is much like the general run of post-war Italian realism. Its only specific interest lies in its news from Poland. But it is remarkable that politics is never mentioned and there is no hint of strict police supervision.

Taiga, the second film, takes its title from a district of Siberia where there is a camp for German prisoners who are kept at forced labor by the Russians. In revenge a repulsed Soviet officer sends a young female German doctor to this camp; and the film tells how—by sleeping (literally) with these men, tending to them, and falling in love with one of them, she restores hope both to them and to herself, before she is returned to Germany.

Ruth Leuwerik (who astonishingly resembles Anne Baxter) and Hannes Messemer head a good cast. In general the film creates the internal and external atmosphere of the camp, but there are some questionable touches. Miss Leuwerik's flawlessly gleaming teeth and the men's slick daily shaves are not what one expected to see in those circumstances.

The film evokes entirely justified sympathy for these cruelly treated German detainees; still one notes that the camp contains no rooms for surgical experimentation on prisoners, no gas chambers, no mass crematoriums. Now that the Germans have chronicled their own camp sufferings, may we expect a film from them about Auschwitz?

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

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THEATRE

O'Casey's "Juno" as a Musical

WHEN a theatregoer finds himself puzzled by a play and is unable to find the precise reason for his puzzlement, he may turn to a theatre critic for help. But when a critic has the same trouble, to whom does he turn? Why, to the person sitting back of him, of course. At *Juno*, she was a chatty young thing who kept her companion (and me) informed on her reactions to the splendid

Juno, book by Joseph Stein, music and lyrics by Marc Blitzstein (Winter Garden Theatre).

failure over which we were all scratching our heads. Finally, she hit it: "It's the plot that's bothering me, I think."

The critic will have to take it from there, his task in this instance being to uncover just how and why the plot was bothersome and what lessons the failure of *Juno* teaches. Lessons, I fear, are about all that can be salvaged from the enterprise, although it utilized the talents of many who have demonstrated in the past that they knew what they were doing: Marc Blitzstein, who wrote the music and lyrics, Joseph Stein, who wrote the book based on Sean O'Casey's *Juno and the Paycock*, Jose Ferrer, who directed, Agnes de Mille, who did the choreography, and a cast valiantly headed by Shirley Booth and Melvyn Douglas.

Let the diagnosis begin with a description of the symptoms. Shirley Booth, playing Juno, was funny and lovable as always, but it was not possible to identify with any of Juno's many problems. As her primary problem, her husband, Melvyn Douglas turned in a performance both credible and creditable which nevertheless had the same lack of emotional effect as the rest of the show. Monte Amundsen sang Mary Boyle with a lovely voice, but I have only the haziest notion what she sang about. Jean Stapleton, Nancy Andrews, Sada Thompson, and Beulah Garrick performed amusingly as a sort of chorus of cronies, but as far as the action went their function was superfluous. In Jose Ferrer's directing there were occasionally disconcerting lapses, as when he allowed "Captain" Boyle to sit down on a stove on which he was at that moment cooking sausages without, as one would have imagined, cooking his own hams. From watching Oliver Smith's ingenious and picturesque set, I, who have never been to Dublin, got the impression that it is full of cobblestones, though this may have come from the fact that the "new musical," as they called it, was lurching from bump to bump.

Analysis of these symptoms leads to the conclusion that the trouble lay in the writers' failure to realize that O'Casey's play and the "musical" form are unsuited to each other.

O'Casey wrote, as many people know, of the troubles that befall the Boyle family, who live in a Dublin tenement in 1921. "Captain" Boyle, who struts "like a paycock," is a lazy do-nothing. Daughter Mary, torn between her squalid surroundings and her knowledge of the outside world, is seduced by a slicker and conceives an illegitimate child. Son Johnny, who lost an arm and injured his hip in the Irish rebellion, turns into a bitter coward and informs on an associate, an act which leads to the death of both of them. The poverty-stricken family is given hopes of inheriting a large sum of money; but the hope proves illusory, leaving them further in debt than they were before, since they had borrowed heavily on their expectations. Juno, the suffering wife who has more brains and energy than her husband, always picks up the pieces. At the end of the play, she takes her daughter into seclusion for the birth of the fatherless child, while the "Captain" is left drunkenly to complain, as is his wont, that the whole world "is in a state of chassis."

The play is an example of that pathos which passes for tragedy in the modern theatre, and as such it depends upon the creation of a believable social environment and naturalistic presentation of character. These, however, are just the elements from which the "musical" always breaks free. It is the most volatile form which our theatre knows. It is therefore diametrically opposed to the principle of the drama of pathos, which is that the individual is trapped.

As an example of the way this contradiction plagues *Juno*, consider the single set as O'Casey envisioned it for the play. The Boyle's living room was one of the two rooms in a tenancy. It contained a table and several chairs and boxes, a dresser, a bed, a galvanized bath in the corner, a fireplace on which the cooking was done, a pile of coal beside the hearth. It had the air of a cramped, untidy dwelling. In *Juno* the home has at least four rooms, two of which, including a well-equipped kitchen, are shown onstage. No one sleeps in the living room, there is neither coal nor fire in the hearth, the bath is nowhere in sight, and the room is so bare as to make one wonder whether Juno Boyle or any of her family has ever set foot in it before the curtain rose.

The reason for these changes is clear: the multi-set "musical" has to do too much jumping about from place to place and mood to mood to accommodate the restrictions which a naturalistic treatment of the Boyle home would require.

Neither music nor dancing as such is the problem. The problem is the "musical" form itself, which is a combination of book *and* music. Where you have a solid, demanding book, as with *Juno and the Paycock*, you have trouble putting it together *with* music. What the adapters should have done was something much bolder than they dared. They should have cut loose from O'Casey and gone the full length of transmuting his story into new terms. They would have come out with something much more like ballet or opera. The emotion of Juno's pathos or "Captain" Boyle's ridiculous pettiness should have been translated into dance or song or both. *West Side Story* indicates one way it might have been done, the operas of Menotti another, Marc Blitzstein's own *Regina* still another. In those instances, the content of emotion and idea has been transformed into dance or music, and to this end spoken words have been sternly assigned, like unruly children, to do menial chores and sit at second table.

UNLESS adapters are willing to be that radical, the so-called "musical" will have to limit its themes to the exuberant ones. It will be able to handle Cinderella stories, like those of Rodgers and Hammerstein or even *My Fair Lady*, but it will not be able to handle material in

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which the emotions are directed downward and inward. The Blitzstein adaptation of Lillian Hellman's *The Little Foxes* is successful just because he was willing to go all the way and turn it into an opera. As a "musical" with a "book" it would have failed. Broadway is supposed to be frightened of opera. That is its privilege. But to be afflicted with hybrid bores such as *Juno* is to pay a high price for being low-brow.

TOM F. DRIVER

TELEVISION

Censorship of Television — II

A LETTER from a PTA Chairman about sex will send TV producers scuttling to check the writer's agent for costs of a rewrite, but the most vigorous campaigns against brutality and the most pious promises of better things to come change nothing: the producers cheerfully ignore the complaints because they know they've got the audience. They are exploiting something deep in our society in our enormous store of unexpressed hostility. We forget how peaceful and secure this country is—how rare a time in history it has been when it was safe to walk out alone. Though crime statistics show our most typical crime is unprovoked assault or aggravated assault —the explosive release of pent-up hostility—these are not common occurrences. Our lives are characterized by moderation, by repression of hostility generated in constant friction with objectionable and competitive strangers in stores and offices, roaring perilously close on the Freeways, wielding rubber stamps in government offices, threatening credit in the banks. We are expected to be nice guys, to smile, smile, smile. We do not argue in public. It is commonly noted that what we do do is ulcerate, get drunk, be sullen and bitter at home and drive cars as though they were weapons. The violence shows are perhaps a vicarious release of some of this hostility—less an expression of an overtly violent society than a mirror of what lies beneath. At the same time the violence-shows arouse nervousness in people who feel guilty about their suppressed urges—to ram the family car into a parked school bus, or just set fire to the damned house when the laundromat breaks down, or shove the telephone down the boss' blattering mouth. Our problem is aggression, not sex. And TV and its censorship policy show it.

Dr. Charles Winick, in his paper, *Taste and the Censor in Television*, catalogues in detail the incredible and silly restrictions. All the editing of song lyrics:

> . . . authors, too,
> who once knew better words
> only use three-letter words
> writing prose.

The tabu words: idiot, crazy, nuts, moron, nigger, Jesus, blind, cripple are all words that may not be used, even by unsympathetic characters whose use of them might be intended to characterize them and their use as undesirable.

The tabu stereotypes: since presenting Negroes realistically is strong medicine for sponsors who cannot afford to have their names scrawled on walls in the South, and the various organizations defending Negroes have quite rightly persuaded producers to stop showing Negroes solely as buffoons, television acts as though the Negroes had gone away. The exceptions to this are rare enough to have publicity value.

The broadcasting industry takes much credit for thus censoring itself, a policy it feels is in keeping with the spirit of the First Amendment. But the code by which television is censored is not a moral standard; it contains no definition of pornography, nor any test of obscenity. Like the old motion picture code it is simply a list of words, actions and ideas people have objected to. The movie code was and is a commercial convenience, a guide to the market, not self-regulation at all. If a producer can warp a plot through the woof of its prohibitions he knows his picture can be shown in every theatre in the free world; for every objectionable notion his writer introduces he can calculate how many fewer theatres will show his movie, and thus how much his writer has cost him.

This is informal censorship, the total effect of which is that sex is censored by the more sexually unbalanced in the audience, brutality and sadism are exploited for profit, the public is secretly gulled by its government which is allowed to enforce the fiction that it is invariably correct and successful, and the most dramatic and interesting features of our civilization are ignored as controversial. The main motive behind this censorship is to deliver to a sponsor the largest audience of tranquillized millions that can be mustered. The industry insists this is right and proper, (is it not "giving the people what they want"?). But why then do they cry freedom is suppressed when it is proposed that censorship be imposed officially, where it could be open to public scrutiny? There is no freedom of expression under such a code no matter who administers it. One suspects that the only reason they oppose government censorship is that the code would be enforced more consistently.

There is a more subtle and fatal censorship that arises from all this, in the discouragement of writers and imaginative producers. They cannot afford the time and energy trying to sell shows that do not fit the commercial pattern. Eventually they must go elsewhere where they can be heard, or turn whore. And television will then be left entirely to advertising men whose sole standard must be whether it sells; to the sponsors' private whims and commercial policy, and to the pressure groups. And will it then deserve the protection of the First Amendment?

THE answer on present performance is an unenthusiastic yes. For every so often there is something wonderful or daring that makes it all worthwhile. CBS' *Camera Three* gets by uncensored (and unsponsored). There have been suicides on the air (*Mayerling*), religious conflict has been explored (*Little Moon of Alban*), *Martin Luther* was finally played on one television station despite enormous Catholic pressure, *Small World* and *World of Ideas* do talk about all sorts of controversial matters, ballet has been shown despite complaints from viewers that it is obscene, and Edward R. Murrow has made documentaries about integration.

"The criticism that television censors . . . are destroying the taste of the public," writes Dr. Winick, "cannot be accepted unreservedly. . . . After all, the

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fifteen leading best selling books published since 1895 are made up of seven novels by Mickey Spillane, three inspirational volumes, *God's Little Acre* and *Gone With The Wind,* two cookbooks and one babybook . . . in all probability television regularly presents proportionately more high-level, non-Kitsch content than any other mass media." There is no reason for complacency in the fact that the public's taste is low and television's no lower, but what I object to most seriously is that television programming is planned not to entertain but to persuade, and that the same censorship applied to the non-Kitsch has grown out of the commercial policy. While conceding that *Gunsmoke* is better than Mickey Spillane, it is worth noting that the Spillane novels were written solely to entertain and not to sell cigarets and electric razors.

ONE WONDERS, if television is in fact so rigorously censored, whether our historical attitudes toward censorship really apply. The idea that a censor, a clerk with a rulebook, should stand judge over the greatest intellects of his age is clearly repellent to most but not all of us. But it is not objectionable for a clerk to regulate a product that is turned out like dogfood on an endless belt.

We assume that news on television would be exempt from the censor's rules. And yet, after the official and public reaction to the Khrushchev interview, is it possible to assume that news is considered news when it is on television? Even on the present "free" footing, CBS was quite careful to arrange that the President's Press Secretary James Hagerty and the State Department were informed of the interview well beforehand, and there can be no reason for them to have been notified at all unless the network was prepared to withhold the interview if there had been an objection. Can we say then with real assurance that an official censor would not harden reluctance to risk official displeasure into official policy?

For the only purpose of any censor is to protect the witless and childish from influences they are presumed to be unequipped to judge. It always comes back to children, who must be protected from bad taste on the one hand and from corruption by Mr. Khrushchev on the other. If we grant one, we almost certainly must grant the other.

But why can there not be censorship that distinguishes between art and reality, and the exploitation of crude urges or the desire for distraction? The pro-censorship forces almost always assure us their censor will make such distinctions. He will be enlightened, sophisticated and cautious. He will believe as Stockton Helffrich, the chief censor for NBC, "He censors best who censors least."

But in New York, motion pictures are even now licensed by six college graduates, who must have another language besides English, and five years of social work to qualify them. The most anyone says for them is that they are preferable to the caprice of individual police officers or police officers acting on complaint of pressure groups. They satisfy none of the pro-censorship groups, as the current campaign for stiffer censorship demonstrates. There are no more enlightened, cautious and sophisticated men than those presiding over the Catholic Index, which has made of Catholic education a contradiction in terms. At that, the official censorship of the Church is not able to curb its lay organizations which perpetrate the most ludicrous crimes against civilization in the name of purity and sanctity. One is reminded of the attempt to censor line by line the movie of Shaw's *Saint Joan,* which Shaw pointed out, would have distorted the Catholic position in the play into a heresy.

These are the least of the practical dangers. As Judge Woolsey remarked of *Ulysses*, it was a book few juries could judge. Common people, it is charitable to remember, are at a fatal disadvantage turned loose among the clever when words are weapons; their only defense is to arbitrarily limit the weapons. The censor exists only because the mass demands him, and if he does not reflect their ordinariness, poverty of mind and imagination, their prejudice and blindness he is either failing his job or substituting standards of taste of his own, which is self-serving and authoritarian. The sophisticated censor must be the most unhappy man alive. Precisely what he must censor most sharply are those things he knows stand most in need of being dragged out of darkness into light.

It would still be as it was when *Mrs. Warren's Profession* was barred from the English stage because, as Shaw complained, it treated sternly and disapprovingly what the English censor could pass only when it was tricked up into jolly fun. The fact that aggression is now the focus of our problems instead of sex changes nothing; the new pornography only serves anti-human daydreams of brutality and revenge. The producers fear official censorship because it might interfere with their exploitation of prurience, but they are wrong. It would reinforce them.

IT is still possible to rephrase our question, to ask if it is not better to accept a government censor as the only alternative to informal censorship that is part of an instrument to engineer sales demand in the minds of the people. For if it is intolerable that commercial motives should censor television when it is art or news, it is a form of slavery to allow it a monopoly of the field for propagandizing. Perhaps the risks of liberty are indeed too great to be acceptable, but before we decide, it should be determined what it is we gain from any sort of censorship.

The argument is instantly back to children. They must be protected from bad taste. Perhaps that is the sole gain for which we may have to barter art's place in mass media. To quote from a form letter recently mailed to Maryland legislators by members of the Catholic Youth Organization in Baltimore:

> I recognize the fact that God has designed my mind to know the truth and my will to choose the good. Unfortunately since my mind is immature and my will often weak, I am not able to make a proper evaluation of the truth and the good. . . . I recognize the fact that because of [my parents'] limited ability and power they often have to depend upon our state and our religion to help them to determine what may be presented to our minds as truth. . . .

Books, says the mother of two, are different. *The Decameron* does not interest children, and of course graces a mere handful of bookshelves in a nation with


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70 million television sets, most of which are turned on. And yet, television is more easily controllable than reading. A TV set cannot be passed from hand to hand under school desks. It can't be folded into a geography or read by flashlight under the covers. Robert Sarnoff of NBC has often said that it should be the parents' job to control what their children see on television. And is it not?

There is after all an irreducible minimum of risk in bringing up children. The desire to protect them eventually leads to a life deprived of choice; a life not worth living. The child becomes helplessly over-protected, and cut off from reality. It has been remarked that the Catholic Index has a certain value in Catholic life that is served better when it is not enforced, in that it alerts Catholics to an intelligent effort to discriminate in their reading of an Indexed book. It makes them read critically, and barring the possibility that some clever fellow has not made a complete hash of Catholic theology, in the long pull it makes better Catholics of them. But the lesson does not work without exposure. Children, and the television audience must grow up.

There seems to me not an argument for official censorship that does not weigh this dubious and slight advantage against an enormous potential loss of freedom and vitality. If informal censorship is so obviously corrosive, and official censorship is an unacceptable alternative, it may be that something is terribly wrong with the way we conceive of television and the way we go about putting it on. Most certainly the thing to do now is not to freeze it in *statu quo* by arbitrary censorship of any kind. Most of all we need patience and forebearance while we experiment and try new things. Among them are pay-TV, the magazine concept (whereby time is sold in blocks instead of by the program), and perhaps a government subsidized channel for educational and artistic work—in short we need alternatives to pure commercial television.

In any case it cannot be simply abandoned as an artistic and news medium, either to the Mrs. Grundys or the sponsors. To assume that television is nothing but a pastime is to admit that the lives of the masses are not worth living, that any distraction is worthwhile to fill the empty hours while they wait like cattle in a pen for the hammer to fall. The highest pleasure, and the function of art, Aristotle said, was the elevation of the soul through the exercise of emotion, to intensify and extend the awareness of life. To plunge the majority of our society into a darkness where the object of their entertainment is to narrow and dilute their awareness is morally inconceivable. And it is practicably impossible, because the substance of entertainment blends insensibly and inevitably into art.

Entertainments imply if they do not mirror an idea of nature. There is always a plot, and a hero, whose actions imply a desire and a viewpoint. Always there are what E. M. Forster called "those mountains Right and Wrong, the side scenery of the soul," even when the soul represented is paltry, and right and wrong are molehills of nice and naughty, of respectable and disreputable. It is not possible for censorship to make the conflict of these meaningless. It is only possible to adjust them to the prevailing idea of what they should represent. As times change the prevailing ideas, the censors will still be fighting to defend outmoded taste, but everyone will pretend they are not talking about art, but mass media. Nothing is solved; censorship will work as it always has, as a brake, a corrupting influence on the men who control it, yet another of the forces that isolate the brains of our culture from the sluggish body. And nothing gained by it but a convenience of not having to make up one's own mind to switch off programs one doesn't like; the convenience of not having to discipline and watch over one's own children. Perhaps the whole answer is to make television sets with locks and keys.

An answer to all I have said is made in advance by industry spokesmen who resent egghead critics who want to force culture down the throat of the masses, which is not what I want at all. Eric Bentley once wrote of the theatre that those who champion pastime tend to be against art, and that those of us who are for art must make it clear that we are not against pastime, except those pastimes that are designed to replace art. The industry discounts the possibility of the "tongue of the poet in the mouth of the people," or that a western could be rousing entertainment and great art, and that freedom to show generals, businessmen and politicians as subject to human frailty might raise them from their present low estimate in public esteem. I am delighted at our doughty race that sits through the Dinah Shore show regularly. I am not even opposed to advertising or sponsors, but only to their tyranny which is forced on them by the economics of their industry.

But for the tired citizen who watches only quiz shows himself, it is the more important that all of TV reflects his world honestly, however dimly, and that some part of television be used to explore his world for him. He has abandoned responsibility for himself, sinking back into a light sleep of distraction, and he had better see that those who take him over have the freedom and the will to do a good job for him.

FRANK R. PIERSON

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Correspondence

(Continued from page 3)

Anti-Defamation League for the purpose of announcing their publication of a booklet I wrote entitled "A Nation of Immigrants."

In the course of your comments you stated that "Mr. Kennedy would allow immigration of relatives of citizens and resident aliens—and only such immigration." In this you are mistaken. At the press conference I mentioned a total of 10 proposals for modification and revision of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. One of these proposals would substitute for the national origins system of quotas a formula based upon blood relationship between citizens and resident aliens already here and those who seek admittance. One of the other proposals, however, would provide for the admission of non-relatives—refugees and so called "new seed" immigration—under a flexible formula that would take into account our national needs, our aspirations to world leadership and our historical position as a home for the persecuted. Apart from the significance and desirability of the eight other proposals, I believe that these two proposals alone would effect a basic and far-reaching change in our immigration policy.

I am sure you were unaware of the proposal dealing with the admission of non-relatives, or you would not have described the program as "farcical." I am writing this letter so that you may be advised more precisely of the amendments to the Immigration and Nationality law that are under consideration.

JOHN F. KENNEDY
US Senate
Washington, D. C.

. . . and a reply

PUBLISHED reports of Senator Kennedy's press conference, on which our own comment was based, failed to mention his additional proposal of a "flexible formula." Perhaps the omission is attributable to the fact that the nature of this proposal is as yet somewhat hard to grasp. We will of course follow its development in a hopeful spirit. Meanwhile we continue to regret the triviality of the more precise portions of the Senator's program for amending the lamentable McCarran-Walter Immigration Act.

THE EDITORS

► *"The Wages of the Investor"*

SIRS:

I AM INTERESTED to note in Mr. David Lawrence's magazine a signed editorial containing this sentence: "Yet profits are necessary not only to furnish tax money to the government to replenish worn-out tools and to pay the wages of the investors." That word "wages" gave me a chuckle. The wolf is scared into stealing the sheep's clothing! Before long Mr. Lawrence will be talking about the "profits" of the workers.

UPTON SINCLAIR
Monrovia, California

► *A Bouquet for Kauffmann*

SIRS:

I WANT to express my appreciation for the film reviews by Stanley Kauffmann. No film critic has given me such pleasure since the days when James Agee wrote in *The Nation*.

MAURICE KASTEN
New York, N. Y.

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